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The Use of Estimated Pollution Flows in
Agricultural Pollution Control Policy:
Implications for Abatement and Policy
Instruments
James S. Shortle
Flows of water pollutants from agricultural sources are, for all practical purposes,
unobservable by direct monitoring. These flows can, however, be estimated using
hydrological models. The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that uncertainty
on estimated flows is not neutral with respect to the optimal level and allocation of
estimated abatement or with respect to the expected net benefits of alternative pollution
control policy instruments. Policy implications are noted.
The primary basis for the nation’s water pollu-
tion control programs is the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act as amended in 1972.
This legislation established a mandatory Fed-
eral program for point sources of water pollu-
tion but directed the states to develop non-
point control programs [EPA, 1979b]. While
the point source controls have produced sig-
nificant accomplishments, state nonpoint con-
trol programs have provided negligible prog-
ress [GAO]. Yet, in many areas of the nation,
including areas in the Northeast, nonpoint pol-
lution is severe and represents the major ob-
stacle to achieving the nation’s water quality
goals [EPA, 1984]. As a consequence, the im-
plementation of effective nonpoint controls
has become a major environmental policy is-
sue. t Resulting initiatives will have particular
significance for agriculture as the most perva-
sive generator of nonpoint source pollution
[EPA, 1984].
The major problem in controlling agricul-
tural nonpoint pollution is not a technological
one. Research shows that changes in farm
management practices can substantially reduce
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1At the time of this writing, the Serrate Committee on the
Environment and Public Works had recently prepared a bill (S.
2006) for the special purpose of amending the Clean Water Act to
direct the states to develop and implement effective nonpoint
control programs using either mandatory or voluntary strategies.
agricultural loadings [EPA, 1979al. The si~-
niticant obstacles ~re identifying m~nageme~t
practices which are economical as well as ef-
fective (referred to as “Best Management
Practices” (BMPs)), and inducing the adop-
tion of these practices where they will be most
beneficial [EPA, 1984]. Economic research
contributing to the resolution of these prob-
lems has been significant [Alt and Heady;
Boggess et al.; Miranowski et al.; EPA,
1978; Taylor and Frohberg; White and Par-
tenheimer]. Several important economic ques-
tions remain, however.
One such question is the implications for
identifying BMPs, targeting areas for control
programs, and choices among implementation
policies, of the substantial uncertainty regard-
ing the magnitude of agricultural pollution
flows. As with other nonpoint sources, polhl-
tion flows from farms into ground and surface
waters cannot be monitored on a continuou%
and widespread basis with any reasonable de-
gree of accuracy, or at reasonable cost, under
existing economic and technical conditions.
This circumstance would seem to limit se-
verely the integration of efficiency consid-
erations into the design of agricultural non-
point abatement programs since critical fac-
tors influencing the costs and benefits of pollu-
tion control are the magnitude of total abate-
ment and the allocation of this total among
alternative polluters [Baumol and Oates].
There are, however, means by which to al-
leviate partially the monitoring problem. Hy-278 October 1984 NJARE
orological models have been developed for es-
timating agricultural nonpoint pollution flows
by utilizing information on farm management
practices, weather, soil characteristics, and
other relevant factors and research to improve
these models continues. It has been suggested
that the efficiency of abatement programs can
be improved by utilizing estimated pollution
flows provided by these models as substitutes
for actual flows [Anderson et al.; Griffin and
Bromley ]. This view appears to be well-
received in economic research as models for
estimating soil, nutrient, and pesticide losses
have been widely incorporated into economic
analyses of pollution abatement in agriculture.
Perhaps the most important example is Taylor
and Frohberg’s work on the costs of alterna-
tive instruments, including taxes on estimated
soil loss, in the Corn Belt. It must be em-
phasized, however, that in the current state-
of-the-art, hydrological models serve to di-
minish but not to eliminate the uncertainty on
agricultural nonpoint pollution. Consequently,
estimates based upon observations of farm
management practices and other relevant data
do not offer a perfect substitute for accurate
monitoring. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to
expect that developments in this area will ever
provide error-free predictions and, therefore,
a perfect substitute for the true flows.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate
that the uncertainty remaining after the adop-
tion of nonpoint pollution estimation models is
not neutral with respect to the efficient alloca-
tion of abatement levels among sources or the
expected net benefits of alternative control
policies. Implications for nonpoint abatement
programs are noted. The analysis is based
upon an adaptation and extension of Weitz-
man’s and subsequent work to agricultural
nonpoint pollution control. 2
A Nonpoint Pollution Model
Fundamental implications of the uncertainty
remaining on agricultural nonpoint pollution
flows can be developed by considering a sim-
2 Weitzman considers the effects of a public decision makers’
uncertainty regarding the cost and benefit functions for a quantity
on the comparative advantage of quotas over prices in regulation
of the quantity. The quantity is assumed, however, to be readily
observable. Weitzman’s results regarding the neutrality of thh
uncertainty for the choice of instruments have been extended to
pollution control issues in which monitoring is not problematic by
Fishelson, Yohe, and Adar and Griffin, using frameworks which
are essentially the same as Weitzman’s.
ple nonpoint pollution control model. Con-
sider n polluting farms, a pollution regulator,
and assume that there is only one pollutant.
The pollution regulator is taken to be an ex-
pected net benefit maximizer. The issue to
which this paper is addressed is introduced
within this context by assuming that the reg-
ulator cannot observe the movement of the
pollutant off the farms or the delivery of the
pollutant to the receiving water body at rea-
sonable cost by direct monitoring. To reduce
the uncertainty about the flows, and thereby
improve planning, the regulator uses estimates
of field losses and delivery based upon obser-
vations of farm management practices and
other relevant data. The choice of estimation
model, while an issue of obvious interest and
importance, is not considered in this paper.
Instead, it is assumed that the regulator has
already evaluated alternative hydrological
models and adopted a specification consistent
with some set of criteria. One consideration
influencing this choice would be the farm pro-
duction variables required as input data for
alternative pollution estimation models and
the costs of observing these data as well as the
stochastic properties of alternative models. It
is assumed below that the entire set of farm
production variables is required and that this
set can be observed without error at reason-
able cost.
For the purposes of exposition, suppose
that the pollutant is sediment and that the
model chosen by the regulator for estimating
sediment delivery consists of a soil loss model
and a sediment transportation model. The reg-
ulator’s soil loss model is written
Rt = riei + e
(1) e~ = Ft(Xt)
E[e] = O, E[cz] = U,2
where RI is actual soil loss from farm i, ei is an
index of the erosivity of farm management
practices on farm i, Xi is a vector of measure-
ments on farm management practices (produc-
tion variables) employed on farm i, and ~ is a
random error (i = 1, 2, . , . , n).
It is emphasized that this specification is
adopted for illustrative purposes. Ultimately,
the relevant specification would depend,
whether for sediment delivery control or other
types of nonpoint pollutants, on the results of
hydrological research and the use of that re-
search by pollution regulation authorities. For
the objectives of this analysis, the essentialShortle ‘ Pollution Control Policy 279
feature of this specification is that it relates an
unobservable emissions flow to observations
of what is being done on the farm in a stochas-
tic framework.3 However, while this specifica-
tion is primarily adopted for illustrative pur-
poses, there is some “real world” appeal to it.
To see this, consider the widely used Univer-
sal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) developed by
Wishmeir and Smith. The form of the esti-
mated USLEis A= R. K.L. S. C. Pwhere
A is estimated annual average gross erosion,
The product of the first four variables is an
estimate of annual average erosion on a con-
tinuously fallow but tilled field, given the soil,
rainfall, and slope characteristics at the loca-
tion. The product of the last two variables
adjusts the previous quantity for the effects of
crop management practices (e.g., crop rota.
tions and tillage practices) and structural ero-
sion control practices carried out on the field
by the farmer. In effect, the product C “ P
serves as an index of the erosivity of farm
management practices. In the specification of
the erosion model above, the variable ei may
be thought of as an index such as C “ P deter-
mined by observations on crop rotations, till-
age practices, residue management practices
and other variables required by the estimation
model chosen by the regulator. These vari-
ables are the elements of the vector X,. The
parameter ri maybe thought of as analogous to
the product R o K ~ L . S, determined by
observation of soil characteristics, weather
factors, and other variables required by the
estimation model chosen by the regulator,
The sediment transportation model adopted
by the pollution regulator is written
(2) S=&iRi+y
i=1
E[y] = O, E[y2] = Oyz
where S is actual sediment delivery, Si is the
true expected sediment delivery ratio for farm
i, and y is a random disturbance (i = 1, 2>. ...




ci = sir, (i = 1, 2).
(3)
1 E[A]=R ~S,E+Y =0,
L j=i J
3The form of (3) is fairly general in that it relates unobservable
emissions to a vector of measurements of farm decisions in a
stochastic framework. The purpose of the index e, is to facilitate





+ 2cov(15, y) ~ si + UY2
i=l
The comments made above about the purpose
and essential feature of the soil loss model
specification apply to the specification of the
sediment delivery model. There is, however,
“real-world” appeal to this specification since
sediment delivery ratios are widely used to
relate erosion to sediment delivery.
From (3) it is evident that the uncertainty
regarding sediment delivery will at least be
due to random disturbances (c and y). How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that the soil
loss model parameters (ri; i = 1, 2, . . . , n),
and the delivery ratios (si; i = 1, 2, . . . . n) are
unknown, thus adding to the uncertainty on
delivery. Further, while the erosivity of farm
management practices (ej; i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
are, by assumption, readily observed once
farmers have made management decisions,
these quantities will generally be uncertain in a
planning context. That is, when planning for
pollution control, the regulator may be uncer-
tain of the responses of farmers to some forms
of intervention—e.g., participation in cost-
sharing programs, This uncertainty arises as a
result of imperfect information on abatement
costs on farms. Consequently, in a planning
context the uncertainty about sediment deliv-
ery will generally be further compounded by
uncertainty of farm responses to policy be-
cause of uncertainty regarding the costs of
abatement on farms.
To complete the model it is necessary to
define costs and benefits. Following previ-
ous practice [Adar and Griffin; Fishelson;
Weitzman; Yohe], the damage cost function,
and the profit function introduced below, are
specified as quadratic forms to facilitate the
analysis. If the uncertain y in the problem is
small this is not unreasonable; for then a
second-order Taylor series expansion pro-
vides a reasonable approximation of the true
functions about the optimum [Samuelson].
The sediment damage cost function is written
(4) D = dOS + d$z.280 October 1984
It is further assumed, again following previous
practice, that the regulator knows the true
value of dl, which is assumed positive, but is
uncertain of the true value of the parameter do.
These assumptions imply that the marginal
damage cost is linear with a known (positive)
slope but uncertain intercept. While these as-
sumptions are simplistic, they are sufficient
for the purposes of this analysis.
It is to be noted that (4) could be viewed
alternatively as a representation of the reg-
ulator’s own preferences rather than as a true
damage cost function, This alternative view of
(4) would seem appropriate if the regulator has
insufficient information about economic dam-
ages to use damage costs to specify tradeoffs.
It is also to be noted that there are limiting
forms of (4) in which the marginal damage
cost, in either view, approaches a vertical line
at some level of sediment delivery. These lim-
iting forms would imply either lexicographical
preferences or extreme threshold effects. In
the case of these limiting forms, the limiting
form of the expected net benefit maximization
problem facing the regulator is a problem of
minimizing the expected costs of achieving a
specified target level of total estimated sedi-
ment delivery.
Farm profits are expressed as a function of
the erosivity of farm management practices.
For farm i, the profit function is
(5) m, = aie, + biei’
(i=l,2, . . .. n).
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Optimal Estimated Pollution
Given probability distribution functions for
the unknown parameters rl, rz, S1, S2, do, %,
and w, and for the random disturbances l and
A,the regulator can form an expectation of(6).
This expectation is written
(~ E[NB] = (~, – &&)e,
+ [bl – ~1(&2 + crlz)]elz
+ (~ – d&Jez
+ [b2 – dl(C22 + a22)]e22
– 2d1(~l& + crJelez – dluA2
where &, &, &l,Cz,and do are respectively the
regulator’s expectations of al, %, c1, Cz, and
c&; and where Var(ci) =i U? (i = 1, 2) and
Cov(c,, c,) + cr,,. It is assumed in this expres-
sion and below that the regulator’s perceived
distributions for the parameters c1 and C2are
independent of the perceived distributions of
al, %, ~, and h. It is also assumed that the
perceived distributions of al and ~ are inde-
pendent of the distributions of d and A, which
are in turn assumed to be independent, These
assumptions are reasonable and do not detract
from the analysis.
The values of the erosivity indexes (el and
ez) which maximize (7) equate the expected
profit of more erosive management to the ex-
pected damage cost of more erosive manage-
ment at the margin for both farms. These op-
timal values are readily determined to be
(i, j= l,2; i# j).
As above, it is assumed that the regulator
knows the true value of the parameter bi,
which is assumed negative, but is uncertain of
the value of ai (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). These
assumptions imply linear marginal profits with
known (negative) slopes but uncertain inter-
cepts. Again, these assumptions are simplistic
but sufficient for the purposes of this analysis.
Combining (3), (4), and (5) under the as-
sumption that n = 2, the regulator’s net benefit
function is
(6) NB = (a, – &c, – 2c,dJ)e,
+ (a, – docz– 2c2dlh)ez
+ (bl – dlclz)elz + (b2 – dlczz)
—2dlc,c,elez – (d,k2 + 4A).
Assuming that the regulator constructs esti-
mates of soil loss and sediment delivery using
moments of the perceived distributions of pa-
rameters of the runoff and delivery models,
this result implies the optimal estimated soil
loss from farm i is tie*i, where ?*is the reg-
ulator’s expectation of ri(i = 1, 2). Optimal
estimated sediment delivery is &e*l + &e*z.
To consider how uncertainty on true erosion
and sediment delivery affects the magnitude
and allocation of the ex ante efficient esti-
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e*i = – dle*l(fii - &~i)
(11) &,2 e*l+e*
(e”, + e*,)2
where D is the denominator of (8).
In order for the second order conditions for
a maximum to be satisfied it must be true that
D >0 and [b, – dl(~i’ + criz)] <0 (i = 1, 2).
Further, if e*i >0 it must be true that (tii –
doei) >0 (i = 1, 2). With these restrictions and
the assumption that dl >0 it follows that (9),
(10), and (11) are each negative in sign. To-
gether (9) and (10) imply that the greater the
value of either mlzor cr22,the lesser the optimal
level of estimated soil loss and sediment deliv-
ery from both farms. Note that this implies
that the optimal estimated levels of soil loss
will be less than the estimated soil losses
which maximize (6) when the random vari-
ables al, az, cl, C2, do, and k are set to their
expected values. The implication of (11) is
that the greater is mlz,the lesser the proportion
of total estimated soil loss and sediment deliv-
ery from farm i (i = 1, 2). Consequently, the
greater the value of U,z the lesser the optimal
estimated soil loss and sediment delivery from
both farms and the lesser the proportion of the
total estimated flows from farm i, all other
things equal (i = 1, 2).
To illustrate the importance of these results,
suppose that the regulator ignores the uncer-
tainty regarding the random variables al, az,
cl, C2,do, and Aand proceeds as if their expec-
tations were the true values. One consequence
of this, given the assumptions of the model,
would be to require too little estimated soil
loss and sediment delivery abatement from
both farms. A second maybe misallocation of
abatement among farms. For example, if it
were the case that the expected marginal profit
and sediment delivery functions were identical
for both farms (&l = 52, bl = bl, and cl = Q,
the certainty equivalent solution would dis-
tribute estimated control equally between the
two farms. But if the uncertainty regarding the
true runoff and delivery parameters is greater
for the first farm than for the second (ml’ >
m22),then estimated sediment delivery should
be less from the first farm than from the sec-
ond to maximize expected net benefits.
From this discussion it is evident that the
uncertainty which remains on agricultural
nonpoint pollution, after the adoption of mod-
els for estimating the unobservable flows, is
not neutral with respect to either the total es-
timated level of expected net benefit maximiz-
ing abatement or the expected net benefit
maximizing allocation of abatement among
sources. The practical planning implications of
this result will be discussed subsequently.
Choice’of Instruments
The issue to which the analysis now proceeds
is the implication of the uncertainty which re-
mains on agricultural nonpoint pollution for
the expected net benefits of alternative im-
plementation policies. The purpose is not to
evaluate exhaustively the broad range of al-
ternative pollution control implementation
strategies but is rather to demonstrate that the
uncertainty which remains is not neutral with
respect to the expected net benefits of alterna-
tive policy approaches. This is done by con-
sidering three alternative approaches which
are particularly instructive. These alternatives
are an estimated soil loss standard, a linear
estimated soil loss tax, and restrictions on the
choice of farm management practices,4 These
restrictions may also be thought of as land-use
regulations. To simplify the analysis further,
only one farm is considered.
Eliminating the second farm and maximiz-
ing expected net benefit with respect to el
identifies the ex ante efficient value of e, as
4While each of these approaches has been proposed, the exist-
ing structure of point source control policy suggests that manda-
tory taxes and standards are not likely to be adopted to achieve
nonpoint control. But this is not the issue being considered.
Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that the uncertainty on
agricultural pollution has implications for the expected costs of
alternative control strategies, It is, however, not unlikely, in the
author’s opinion, that mandatory technical restrictions will be
adopted for nonpoint control if the Congress acts to require the
states to achieve significant reductions. State nonpoint control
programs which have emerged as a consequence of Section 208of
the Federal Water Pottution Control Act, as amended, have em-
phasized the voluntary approach which has long characterized soil
conservation policy in the nation [EPA, 1979a; EPA, 1980]. At a
time when state and Federal budgets are severely strained, farm
subsidy policies in general are under attack, the effectiveness of
voluntary soil conservation programs severely questioned, and the
effectiveness of voluntary nonpoint control programs demonstra-
bly negligible, it would seem unlikely that the states will uniformly
pursue voluntary cost-sharing programs for nonpoint control if the
Congress acts to require significant nonpoint abatement. Until the
current deliberations on nonpoint control have taken their course
and the states res~nded, the enforcement mechanisms for future
nonpoint control remain uncertain. However, the WPWJ of the
polluter-pays principle which has characterized industrial point
source control and been manifested in technical restrictions poticies
would seem substantird under present circumstances.282 October 1984 NJARE
—
(12)
(A, - &tJ e*l =
2[bl – dl(clz + U12)] “
This result is used to specify the optimal esti-
mated soil loss standard: Ilel s te*i. By im-
posing this standard the regulator insures that
the estimated soil loss resulting from the farm-
er’s selection of management practices (i-lel)
will not exceed the level of estimated soil loss
the regulator believes to be optimal (ile*l),
Farm profit with a linear tax on estimated
soil loss is
(13) r = alel + blelz —tflel
where t is the tax rate on estimated soil loss.
Maximizing profit with respect to e, identifies
the farmer’s optimum under the tax as
(14)
Substituting (14) into (6), absent the variable
ez, and maximizing the expected value of (6)
with respect to the tax rate t identifies the
expected net benefit maximizing tax rate as
Let E [NBI] denote the expected net benefit
of the standard flel = fle* ~ and let E [NB.J
denote the expected net benefit under the tax
t = t*. Define A as E[NBJ – E[NBJ. This
difference is the expected cost of choosing the
optimal linear tax over the optimal standard,
Assuming the range of al to be such that the
standard on estimated soil loss is always bind-
ing, this expected cost can be written
(16) A = m,z~l + dl(~lz + r-r12)]
4b12
where cr~2= Var(aJ.
If A > 0 the optimal standard yields a
greater expected net benefit than the optimal
linear tax and will therefore be preferred on
efficiency grounds. The reverse is true if A <
0. If A = Othen neither policy is preferred to
the other. The latter will be the case if U,2 = 0.
Consequently, a preference for one policy
over the other, based on the expected net ben-
efit criterion, will arise only if there is uncer-
tainty regarding the marginal profit function.
This result has been demonstrated previously
[Weitzman; Fishelson; Yohe; and Adar and
Griffin]. From this it follows that the uncer-
tain y on agricultural nonpoint emissions, or
the damage costs resulting from these emis-
sions alone, will not imply an expected cost
basis for choosing among these two policies.
Given that the marginal profit is uncertain
(m.2 > O), the preferred policy will depend
upon the sign of the numerator of (16). For the
second order conditions for optimizing values
of e*1and t* to be satisfied it must be true that
[b, - d1(61z + u,’)] <0. This is satisfied by
previous assumptions regarding the signs of b~
and dl. But, under these assumptions, the sign
of (16) is ambiguous.
To consider the possibilities, suppose that
the true value of the expected delivery param-
eter (cJ is known so mlz = O. That is, the
pollution model is known up to an additive
random variable (A). The sign of (16) then
depends upon the relative absolute values of
bl and dl~ ~z.The former is the slope of the
marginal profit function and the latter is the
slope of the marginal damage cost function in
terms of el. The tax policy is preferred to the
standard under these circumstances if lbII >
d1~12.If Ibll < d1612the standard is preferred.
Thorough discussions of the logic of these
results may be found in several sources
[Weitzman; Fishelson; Adar and Griffin].
Stated most succinctly, when the slope of the
marginal profit is greater in absolute value
than the slope of the marginal cost, the ex-
pected social cost from constraining the farm
to e* ~,when the true optimum is greater than
or less than this quantity, exceeds the ex-
pected social cost of permitting the farm man-
ager to respond to economic conditions better
known to him than to the policy maker in the
choice of el. The opposite is true when Ibll <
d162,
Allowing for uncertainty in the value of c1,
the sign of (16) depends upon the relative
magnitudes of Ibll and dl(612 + m12).If Ibll <
dl~,2 the standard will be preferred to the tax
regardless of the magnitude of W12.But, if lb11
> d& 12the magnitude of crlzwill determine the
preferred policy, It is evident from this that
the presence of uncertainty regarding the ex-
pected delivery parameter c1 favors the esti-
mated soil loss standard policy. The reason for
this is that uncertainty regarding the value of
c~implies uncertain y regarding the slope of
the marginal damage cost in terms of the
erosivity of farm management practices (el)
and is accounted for in decision making by
increasing the magnitude of the slope relative to
its certainty equivalent.
Note that as dl (the slope of the sedimentShortle Po[iution Control policy 283
damage cost function) ~ @the estimated soil models is not neutral with respect to the ex-
10SSstandard will clearly be preferred to”the petted costs of alternative policies when
estimated soil loss tax, This implies that an abatement costs are uncertain. While this
estimated emissions standard will be preferred point has been demonstrated by comparing a
to an estimated emissions tax when the reg- select group of policies, it is generally applica-
ulator’s preferences are of the limiting forms ble. Policy implications of this result are dis-
previously noted. Consequently, when the cussed below.
regulator wishes to minimize the expected
cost of maintaining estimated sediment deliv-
ery below some value, an estimated soil loss Summary and Conclusions
standard is preferred to a tax on estimated soil
loss. Whether the use of pollution estimation mod-
Now, consider a policy of restricting the els for nonpoint pollution control planning is
management practices selected by a farmer. economically advantageous is a value of in-
Specifically, suppose that the regulator re- formation problem, It would seem reasonable
quires the farmer to choose from a set of prac- to expect the value of information to be sig-
tices determined to yield an estimated soil loss nificant as long as reasonably accurate estima-
(f’,el) less than or equal to the optimal esti- tion models can be developed. This, however,
mated soil loss (fle* ~).These practices will be is not the issue with which this analysis is
referred to as the set of BMPs designated by concerned. Reasonably accurate estimation
the regulator. If the set is exhaustive of all models do not provide a perfect substitute for
possible practices that will yield a value of fiei accurate monitoring. It has been demonstrated
~ ?le**it is obvious that the practice restric- that the uncertainty which remains after the
tions policy will be as efficient as the estimated adoption of estimation models is not neutral
emissions standards policy for the two policies with respect to the aggregate level of abate-
are in fact the same policy. If, however, the ment, the allocation of abatement among
set of permissible practices is not exhaustive sources, or choices among policy instruments.
of all possible practices that will yield flel s This discussion now turns to some practical
tle*l, the practice restrictions policy may implications of these results,
not be as efficient as the estimated emissions It is useful to preface this discussion by
standards policy and cannot be more efficient. noting three key features that must be incor-
The reason for this is simply that in this situa- porated into state nonpoint control programs if
tion the management practices which achieve they are to be effective and economical [EPA,
fie**at least cost under some likely states of 1984], One is to identify the nonpoint sources
the world may not be included in the permis- which are responsible for delivering pollutants
sible set. From this it follows that the set of to significantly impacted water bodies. An-
BMPs designated by the regulator ought to other is to identify BMPs which will effec-
include all management practices which will tively and economically reduce nonpoint load-
permit the farmer to obtain a value of flel ~ ings to acceptable levels. The third is to select
fle* ~under l’ikely states of the world. But, a policy strategies that will secure the use of
policy of requiring the farmer to choose from designated BMPs. Research and planning to-
this set of BMPs will be no more efficient than wards incorporating these features must
requiring the farmer to satisfy an estimated clearly proceed under conditions of uncer-
soil loss standard. Consequently, there is no tainty on existing flows and responses of these
expected cost basis for preferring a well- flows to changes in management practices, the
specified management practices restrictions costs of changes in management practices, and
policy to an estimated emissions standards the damage costs resulting from nonpoint load-
policy under the assumption of this analysis, ‘rigs.
And this means that the comments made There are several implications of this analy-
above when comparing a tax on estimated loss sis for targeting agricultural nonpoint sources
standards also apply to a comparison between and identifying agricultural BMPs to achieve
the estimated soil loss tax and well-defined set water quality improvements in water bodies
of BMPs. seriously impaired by these sources. The
From these comments, it is evident that the analysis implies that other things equal, farms
uncertainty on agricultural nonpoint pollution and watersheds in which the uncertainty on
remaining after the adoption of estimating agricultural loadings is greater should be284 October 1984 NJARE
called on to provide more estimated abate-
ment than sources for which the uncertainty
on loadings is less. The issue here has to do
primarily with the perceived accuracy of pre-
diction procedures in alternative situations.
If, for example, the adopted prediction pro-
cedures are perceived to be more accurate
in one farm setting than another or in one
farming area than another, then, other things
being equal, cost-benefit considerations indi-
cate more estimated abatement from the more
uncertain farms or farming areas. Such varia-
tions in the perceived accuracy of prediction
methods are clearly to be expected in varying
degree between farms within given areas and
between farming areas. A variety of physical
conditions and chemical processes influence
the movement of nonpoint pollutants from
farms to receiving waters. These factors can
vary widely between locations and are better
understood in some settings than in others
[EPA, 1976] This variation in understanding
about the processes involved implies varia-
tions in the perceived accuracy of prediction
methods. Practical considerations may limit
the distinction between farms but the notion of
targeting clearly calls for distinctions between
sources by type of land-use and location
[EPA, 1984]. The principal implication of this
analysis for targeting is that variations in the
perceived accuracy of prediction models for
loadings must be accorded due consideration
in determinations of areas in which control
programs will be more economically bene-
ficial.
The previous comments obviously imply
that the uncertainty on nonpoint pollution
should also have a role in designating BMPs
for targeted sources. One important implica-
tion is that designated BMPs ought to provide
for more estimated abatement than would be
indicated by certainty equivalent constructs.
This means that moments higher than ex-
pected loadings are relevant information when
designating BMPs. Another implication is that
BMPs designated for more uncertain sources,
whether farms within watersheds or different
watersheds, should provide for greater esti-
mated abatement levels than BMPs designated
for more certain sources, other things being
equal. Again, practical considerations may
constrain distinctions between farms within
watersheds but for targeting to be successful,
it is clear that distinctions between watersheds
are necessary.
There are two principal implications of this
analysis for choices among implementation
policies. First, the analysis implies that the
uncertainty on agricultural loadings will affect
expected net benefits of alternative policy ap-
proaches and should therefore be considered
when selecting appropriate policies, With re-
gard to the specific policies considered, this
analysis suggests that expected cost-benefit
considerations favor a policy of setting non-
point estimated emissions standards or a pol-
icy of requiring farmers to choose manage-
ment practices from a well-defined set of
BMPs, to a linear estimated nonpoint emis-
sions tax policy. The second implication for
policy choices follows from the first. The
analysis of policy choices in the previous sec-
tion indicated that there are several factors
influencing the expected net benefits of alter-
native nonpoint abatement policies. These fac-
tors include the marginal costs and benefits of
abatement and the uncertainty of abatement
costs. These factors will vary from location to
location and it follows that appropriate poli-
cies will vary from location to location and can
be determined only after evaluating the rele-
vant information for an area, An additional
implication of this study is that variations in
the uncertainty on nonpoint pollution between
areas can be one basis for establishing differ-
ent policies for different areas since this uncer-
tainty can give rise to differences in the ex-
pected costs and benefits of alternative pro-
grams
A further implication of this analysis is that
the appropriate policy design for estimating
control should evolve over time with im-
proved information on control costs, benefits,
and pollutant delivery, It is to be noted in this
regard that since the expected net benefits of
estimated control differ for different policy de-
signs, the value of information on costs, ben-
efits, and delivery depend on the policy used.
This observation suggests that the value of
research to improve information on delivery
from farms as well as other aspects of the
agricultural pollution control problem is a fac-
tor to be considered when formulating policy
for managing estimated flows,
Before concluding this paper, some implica-
tions for the applied agricultural nonpoint re-
search agenda should be noted. Little consid-
eration has been given to the policy implica-
tions of uncertainty in the applied economic
research on agricultural nonpoint source con-
trol to date [Kramer et al.]. This analysis indi-
cates that uncertainty on farm profits and un-Pollution Control Policy 285
certainty on pollution flows from farms re-
maining after the adoption of pollution estima-
tion models can have important implications
for the design of pollution control programs
for agriculture. Consequently, to provide pol-
icy makers with sound economic implications
of programs designs it is essential that future
applied investigations consider the role of un-
certainty. To do so fully would require consid-
eration of a number of issues beyond those
incorporated into this analysis. Further issues
this analysis points to directly or indirectly
include the choice of estimation models, the
costs of monitoring farm production and other
program administration costs, and the implica-
tions of uncertainty on abatement costs faced
by farmers,
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